This paper explores the motivations and institutional incentives of participants involved in the development of regulation aimed at reducing health risks, with a goal of understanding and identifying solutions to what the Bipartisan Policy Center has characterized as "a tendency to frame regulatory issues as debates solely about science, regardless of the actual subject in dispute, [that] is at the root of the stalemate and acrimony all too present in the regulatory system today." We focus our analysis with a case study of the procedures for developing National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act, and attempt to identify procedural approaches that bring greater diversity (in data, expertise, experience, and accountability) into the decision process.
In each step [of the risk assessment process], a number of decision points (components) occur where risk to human health can only be inferred from the available evidence. Both scientific judgments and policy choices may be involved in selecting from among possible inferential bridges, and we have used the term risk assessment policy to differentiate those judgments and choices from the broader social and economic policy issues that are inherent in risk management decisions. 15 Thus, the risk assessment phase itself embeds judgments that need to be made to produce a result that scientists can give to policymakers; and these judgments, intentionally or not, can bias the ultimate advice provided to decision-makers and the public.
This fuzziness between science and policy choices is not unique to health and safety regulations. In 1972 Alvin Weinberg pointed out, "Many of the issues which arise in the course of the interaction between science or technology and society-e.g., the deleterious side effects of technology, or the attempts to deal with social problems through the procedures of sciencehang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science." 16 To describe such questions, Weinberg coined the term "trans-science."
Figure 1 below illustrates the relationship between pure scientific inputs and policy decisions, and the role of "trans-science" and judgment in interpreting and presenting evidence relevant to policy. "Risk assessment policy" includes various judgments, including: which science is considered; how individual studies are weighed and combined; when competing theories are considered appropriately supported for inclusion; which models to use; and in general, what to do in the face of scientific uncertainty. It also guides the way in which risks are characterized and communicated. Policymakers and the public are often unaware of the influence of these risk assessment policy choices or the existence of alternative choices that are equally plausible. Instead, assessments often generate precise-sounding predictions that hide not only considerable uncertainty about the actual risk, but the reliance on biased inferences and assumptions for handling that uncertainty.
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As noted above, this is a problem of hidden policy judgments. While some judgment is necessary to translate scientific evidence into risk assessment, current risk assessment policies are not transparent, and lead to distortions in risk estimates and false precision in the presentation of scientific information. 19 These practices obscure the boundary between science and policy, and contribute to the politicization of science through biased science advice.
Former EPA scientist Robert T. Lackey cautions against this problem, which he calls "normative science": 18 For example, EPA's "Risk Assessment Principles and Practices" document states: "[s]ince EPA is a health and environmental protective agency, EPA's policy is that risk assessments should not knowingly underestimate or grossly overestimate risks. This policy position prompts risk assessments to take a more 'protective' stance given the underlying uncertainty with the risk estimates generated." (USEPA 2004, 13-14) 19 Gray, G. & Cohen, J. "Rethink Chemical Risk Assessment." Nature. 2012 Sep; 489. P. 27.:"the problem is the EPA's use of assumptions that it claims are 'public health protective,' which err on the side of overstating risk when data are lacking…. Such inflated risk estimates can lead to overly stringent regulations and can scramble agency priorities because the degree of precaution differs across chemicals." 
"Risk Assessment
Policy"
"Trans-science" "Inferential bridges"
Choice of studies Default assumptions Uncertainty Point estimates Science should be objective and based on the best information available. Too often, however, scientific information presented to the public and decision-makers is infused with hidden policy preferences. Such science is termed normative, and it is a corruption of the practice of good science. Normative science is defined as "information that is developed, presented or interpreted based on an assumed, usually unstated, preference for a particular policy choice." 20 Normative science can be masked by presentations that are not transparent. For example, in its 2011 evaluation of EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) assessment for formaldehyde, the National Academy of Sciences raised concerns about recurring "problems with clarity and transparency of the methods":
In general, the committee found that the draft was not prepared in a consistent fashion; it lacks clear links to an underlying conceptual framework; and it does not contain sufficient documentation on methods and criteria for identifying evidence from epidemiologic and experimental studies, for critically evaluating individual studies, for assessing the weight of evidence, and for selecting studies for derivation of the [reference dose] RfCs and unit risk estimates.
21

When risk management becomes a science charade
While embedded policy judgments raise concerns of hidden bias in the risk assessment phase of a rulemaking, policy judgments couched as "science" can raise similar problems in the risk management phase.
While there should be a clear distinction in the minds of scientists and policymakers between describing what "is" and deciding what "ought to be," the two are sometimes unintentionally, or intentionally, conflated when the ultimate policy decision is presented as dictated solely by "the science." We adopt the phrase "science charade" 22 to describe the camouflaging of controversial policy decisions as science.
Scientists and/or policymakers create a science charade by describing a policy decision in purely scientific (or scientific sounding) terms without revealing the trans-science and policy factors that played a role in the decision. For instance, in 1982, EPA faced a decision whether to regulate formaldehyde under the Toxic Substances Control Act. In order to regulate, the Administrator had to find "a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human beings." 23 Such a decision inherently involves policy judgments regarding the interpretation of the terms "reasonable" basis, "significant" risk and "serious or widespread harm." Yet, in presenting the issue to the Administrator of EPA, the Assistant Administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances couched the decision as a purely scientific judgment:
(a) formaldehyde is a carcinogen in the rat by the inhalation route; (b) its carcinogenic potential appears to vary significantly with species and route; (c) under certain exposure conditions it could present some carcinogenic risk to humans; and (d) given available data the risk estimates suggest that certain populations may experience a carcinogenic risk -albeit low -due to formaldehyde exposure. However, because of the nature of the toxicology data and the unreliability in the exposure data one cannot reasonably conclude, at this time, that formaldehyde poses a significant risk among the U.S. population.
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Scientists can unwittingly impose, or intentionally foist, science charades on decisionmakers by hijacking risk management decisions. Policymakers can create science charades on their own (as in the example above), or scientists and policymakers may cooperate in disguising value-laden decisions as the necessary result of "the best science." Regardless, the science charade results in similar harms as hidden policy judgments in risk assessments: the public is cheated of sound and open policy making and the integrity of science advice is weakened.
Falling prey to the "is-ought" fallacy
As noted above, science describes what "is" but it cannot solely determine what "ought to be." Both hidden policy judgments in risk assessments and science charades result from incorrectly mixing up positive information about what "is" with normative advice about what "ought to be." These errors are examples of the "is-ought fallacy." 25 This fallacy, first identified by philosophers David Hume and G.E. Moore in the 18th century, happens when a prescription is erroneously embedded in, or directly follows, a description, as if one automatically follows from the other. For instance, the statement "ambient carbon dioxide concentrations are increasing, therefore we must stop burning fossil fuels" may or may not be good public policy but the latter policy decision does not necessarily follow from the former scientific fact. This fallacy is not unique to science. It "is common and has been the source of many mischievous errors" 27 confounding diverse areas of study and decision making. 28 However, it can be particularly pernicious when it influences government regulations that affect the lives of millions of people and the allocation of significant resources. Both scientists and policymakers may fall prey, willfully or not, to the is-ought fallacy.
Scientists and policymakers may intentionally invoke the is-ought fallacy, although for different reasons. Scientists may wish to influence policymakers by subtly absorbing nonscientific assumptions in their risk assessments or in descriptions of what "is" so that it appears there is no better risk management alternative than the one they prefer. Likewise, decisionmakers, such as political appointees, who may fear criticism of a particular decision can muddle descriptions of "is" with assumptions regarding what "ought to be" in the risk management phase of rulemaking and claim that "science" dictated the outcome. In both cases, the fallacy allows scientists and/or policymakers to create a science charade by dressing up a policy decision and disguising it in a lab coat.
The harms of politicized science and the example of NAAQS
The process by which EPA sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for "criteria pollutants" 29 under the Clean Air Act illustrates some of the perverse incentives involved in developing regulations, which can encourage biased science advice and a science charade. The NAAQS process is particularly worth examining, because on the one hand it is held up by some as an ideal by which all science-based rulemaking should be developed, 30 http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/Steve_Johnson_Letter_on_NAAQs_final_3-13-08_2.pdf In 2011, the President intervened again. EPA was poised to revise the ozone standard amid strong objections from other parts of the government and the regulated community, when President Obama took the unusual step of "request [ing] that Administrator Lisa Jackson withdraw the draft ozone NAAQS" from interagency review. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-air-qualitystandards. This is the only time during President Obama's administration that the White House has returned a regulation to an agency. 32 According to Wagner, "It would seem that such science-based mandates not only invite, but actually compel the science charade due to the threat of reversal if an agency frankly acknowledges the inherent scientific uncertainties and its requisite retreat to economic, technological, and other policy considerations in reaching a final, quantitative standard." Wagner 1995 at 1668. 33 For example, see posts by the Center for Progressive Reform (http://www.progressivereform.org/13RulesOzone.cfm) and the Center for Regulatory Solutions (http://centerforregulatorysolutions.org/will-epas-ozone-ambitions-reveal-more-collaboration-with-greengroups/) 34 Eisenhower warned in his farewell address, "Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite."
Using the NAAQS as a case study, the next section explores the procedures for developing regulations and the institutional incentives that may encourage the is-ought fallacy and contribute to politicized science through hidden policy judgments and the science charade.
Participants in the Rulemaking Process, their Motives & Behavior
The development of regulation in the United States involves several steps and numerous parties. First, Congress must pass and the President must sign legislation authorizing regulation. Legislation addressing health and environmental risks generally expresses broad goals and objectives, but leaves fact-finding and the details of implementation to executive branch agencies, such as EPA. 35 Regulatory agencies then develop draft proposed regulations consistent with the language in the enabling legislation and according to procedures mandated by both Congress and the President. 36 In particular, the Administrative Procedure Act requires regulatory agencies to notify the public and seek comment on proposed regulations, and to base final regulations on information in the rulemaking record. 37 This notice-and-comment process guarantees interested parties (those affected by potential regulation, non-governmental organizations, and others) an opportunity to present views and information on proposed regulations. 38 Additionally, since 1981, presidents have required agencies to conduct regulatory impact analyses (RIAs) of economically significant regulations, and to subject them to interagency review through the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget. 39 Congress has an opportunity to fast-track a joint resolution to disapprove a final regulation after it is published, 40 and regulations are also subject to judicial review (allowing affected parties to sue to have regulations overturned by the courts).
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Throughout the rule development process and beyond, media will also track and report on regulations and any controversies that may arise. The behavior of each party in the regulatory development process is influenced by these institutional structures and constraints, and the incentives they provide, as a case study of the NAAQS development process illustrates.
Authorizing Legislation
The Clean Air Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-604) directed the newly created Environmental Protection Agency to issue NAAQS for each pollutant for which the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had already issued air quality criteria, and for widespread air pollutants identified in the future that reasonably may be expected to endanger public health or welfare.
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The Act directed the EPA Administrator to set "primary," or health-based, NAAQS at levels that are "requisite to protect the public health … allowing an adequate margin of safety," 43 47 An amicus brief in this case, signed by a bipartisan group of 42 prominent economists, including five Nobel Laureates, argued: "We believe that it would be imprudent for the EPA to ignore costs totally. Not considering costs makes it difficult to set a defensible standard, especially when there is no threshold level below which According to Schoenbrod:
The legislative history and reality made clear that EPA was not to set the ambient standards at zero. So EPA would necessarily have to leave some threat to health. The statute evaded the question of how much. The evasion was intentional. As the author of the Clean Air Act, Senator Edmund Muskie, later admitted, "[o]ur public health scientists and doctors have told us that there is no threshold, that any air pollution is harmful. The Clean Air Act is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it was inaccurate, that there is a threshold. When we set the standards, we understood that below the standards that we set there would still be health effects." 48 The statutory framing makes it much more difficult to follow the Bipartisan Policy Center's first recommendation that "when federal agencies are developing regulatory policies, they explicitly differentiate, to the extent possible, between questions that involve scientific judgments and questions that involve judgments about economics, ethics and other matters of policy." 49 While the Act left the decision for setting NAAQS to "the judgment of the [EPA] Administrator," the 1977 amendments required the Administrator to create an "independent scientific review committee," now known as the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), with authority not only to review the scientific criteria developed by EPA but to "recommend to the Administrator any new national ambient air quality standards and revisions of existing criteria and standards as may be appropriate…" (109(d)(2)) By inviting scientific advisors to make normative recommendations regarding what level is appropriate, this language deliberately confused the distinction between scientific expertise and policy judgment, codifying the input of hidden policy judgment and the is-ought fallacy into the policymaking process. 
Environmental Protection Agency
EPA follows a multi-step process when reviewing and setting NAAQS, as shown in Figure 2 . 51 It begins by developing an Integrated Review Plan that identifies the science and policy issues that will be reviewed during the 5-year assessment. Next, EPA conducts extensive reviews of the available science in what is called an Integrated Science Assessment (ISA). Data on the criteria air pollutants are often extensive, with ISAs running to thousands of pages and including reviews of hundreds or thousands of studies. EPA staff use the results of the ISA to develop a risk and exposure assessment (REA) to evaluate potential risks associated with exposures expected at the existing standard and at alternative standards. To accomplish this, agency staff interpret various studies and data to generate a single concentration-response model to predict health effects at different levels of exposure. EPA's formulation and presentation of the studies and data necessarily involves judgments about which studies to consider and which to exclude, as well as assumptions about what models best fit the selected data and how to extrapolate between observed and predicted exposures. Unfortunately, the many risk assessment policy judgments embedded in these models are not transparent. The findings of the ISA and REA depend heavily on how the staff decides to answer such nonscientific questions as what effects are considered "adverse," how far to "err on the side of safety" when determining the appropriate shape of the exposure-response function, and whether observed associations are sufficient to assume causal effects, even in the absence of plausible biological evidence of causality. For example, EPA considers reversible, asymptomatic cellular changes and transient symptomatic effects (such as a cough) to be "adverse" which is clearly a matter of opinion, not something that can be determined solely on the basis of what "is."
Treatment of uncertainty
Perhaps the most pervasive hidden policy judgments regard the treatment of uncertainty. A recent report from the Institute of Medicine observed:
Uncertainty is inherent in the scientific information upon which health risk estimates are based. Uncertainties enter the health risk assessment process at every step and can be caused by the potential confounders in observational studies, by extrapolation from animal studies to human studies, by extrapolation from high to low dose exposures, by inter-individual variability, and by modeling the relationships between concentrations, human exposures, and human health responses and evaluating the effect of interventions or risk control options on public health risk.
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The uncertainties inherent in these assessments can be significant. For example, one key assumption that drives estimates of the effects of exposure to fine particles (PM 2.5 ) is that "inhalation of fine particles is causally associated with premature death." 53 EPA assumes a causal relationship based on epidemiological evidence of an association between PM concentrations and mortality, however, correlation does not imply causation (cum hoc non propter hoc), and EPA has not been able to identify a biological mechanism to explain the observed correlation. As Dominici, Greenstone and Sunstein observe, "associational approaches to inferring causal relations can be highly sensitive to the choice of the statistical model and set Another key assumption on which EPA's estimates of adverse effects hinge is that the concentration-response function for fine particles is linear within the range of ambient concentrations under consideration. Both theory and data suggest that thresholds exist below which further reductions in exposure to PM 2.5 do not yield changes in mortality response, and that one should expect diminishing returns as exposures are reduced to lower and lower levels.
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However, EPA assumes a linear concentration-response impact function that extends to concentrations down to zero.
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Hidden biases
Based on its policy-related assumptions of a causal, linear, no-threshold relationship between PM 2.5 exposure and premature mortality, EPA quantifies a number of premature mortalities that will be avoided when concentrations of PM 2.5 decline as a result of regulation. If any of these assumptions are false (in other words, if no association exists, if the relationship is not causal, or if the concentration-response relationship is not linear at low doses), the effects of reducing PM 2.5 would be significantly less than EPA's assessments estimate, including zero.
The assumptions of EPA's scientists are not necessarily wrong, but each assumption in the face of uncertainty represents a decision based on policy considerations, not science. The extent to which a resulting standard should err on the side of safety reflects public values that the statute puts in the hands of the EPA Administrator and should be transparent to the public. Yet, these Cox's statistical analysis suggests with a greater than 95% probability that no association exists, and that instead, EPA's results are a product of its choice of models and selected data, rather than a real measured correlation. Krstić's reanalysis shows that "the statistical significance of the correlation is lost after removing one of the metropolitan areas from the regression analysis, suggesting that the results may not be suitable for a meaningful and reliable inference." 56 See, for example Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, "PM 2.5 Standards may be set Lower than Scientifically Justifiable," noting that " extrapolations [to current exposure levels] can be contrary to the basic principles of toxicology where the biological threshold (a level below which no effect is apparent) is a key concept." Available at: http://www.tceq.texas.gov/assets/public/comm_exec/pubs/pd/020/2013/Outlook-Mar EPA has not quantified crucial model uncertainties. Therefore, confidence intervals calculated assuming that the models used are correct are misleadingly narrow and EPA has provided policy makers with no basis for confident predictions about how different changes in the ozone standard would probably affect public health.
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One former EPA science advisor called for "a more explicit characterization of uncertainty in estimates of causality and exposure-response relationships … for both primary and secondary standards," noting:
At present, assessments of "uncertainty" are almost completely focused on the mathematical uncertainty of effects estimates (i.e., confidence intervals on measurements of exposures and effects). This is important of course, but I would like to see a more rigorous discussion of "certainty" in a broader sense. For example, how do the magnitudes of health effects of air pollution rank in comparison to other voluntary and involuntary health risks? Because air pollutants seldom, if ever, exert novel effects, what portion of the total public health effect is plausibly attributable to a pollutant (or to pollution)? What do we know about the relative benefits, and cost-benefit relationships, of different approaches to reducing health burdens that are exerted in part by air pollution? I care not that these issues might not fall within many folks' definition of "scientific information," or that EPA is not supposed to take cost into account in promulgating standards (does any thinking person actually believe that they shouldn't, or don't?). We delude ourselves and miss opportunities to inform policy makers and promote a rational public understanding of risk if we continue to view the "uncertainty" issue as solely one of statistical methodology and data quality, while advocating for the special importance of the particular effects … by which we make our living.
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These uncertainties are further hidden from policy makers when, after the ISA and REA are completed, EPA staff prepares a Policy Assessment (formerly called the Staff Paper) that "bridges the gap" between the ISA and REA, and develops a set of policy options to present to the Administrator. The Policy Assessment "presents staff conclusions regarding the adequacy of the current suite of standards as well as potential alternative standards for [the Administrator's] consideration." 60 This presentation of staff's judgment (informed by CASAC) regarding what is "requisite to protect public health" further obfuscates the line between science and policy judgment and virtually compels the staff to fall prey to the is-ought fallacy. 61 The Policy Assessment presents policy options framed with vague but portentous language, such as "the weight of the evidence" and "a consensus among scientific advisors." Uncertainty at lower levels of exposure is typically discussed vaguely and qualitatively to justify setting levels greater than zero. 62 As a result, the policy options presented by EPA staff, which clearly include nonscientific judgments, attempt to constrain the ultimate decision of the Administrator, who is the accountable decision maker under the Clean Air Act. The staff recommendations, shrouded in scientific language, create a science charade.
One would have difficulty discerning the large impact of nonscientific decisions just by reading the recommendations. For example, the Policy Assessment EPA staff prepared for the fine particle standards set in December 2012 states:
Taking into account both evidence-based and risk-based considerations, staff concludes that consideration should be given to revising the current annual PM Given that these two data points suggest the incremental life savings associated with a reduction from 12 μg/m 3 to 11 μg/m 3 are greater than those associated with a reduction from 13 μg/m 3 to 12 μg/m 3 , it is curious that the Policy Assessment did not recommend, or at least examine, standards below 11 μg/m 3 . Neither the Policy Assessment nor RIA explains this, nor the Administrator's decision to set a standard of 12 μg/m 3 , which these documents suggest leave between 580 and 1,300 lives unprotected.
Instead the RIA justifies the standards as follows:
This action provides increased protection for children, older adults, persons with pre-existing heart and lung disease, and other at-risk populations against an array of PM 2.5 -related adverse health effects that include premature mortality, increased hospital admissions and emergency department visits, and development of chronic respiratory disease. … The revised suite of PM 2.5 standards also reflects consideration of a quantitative risk assessment that estimates public health risks likely to remain upon just meeting the current and various alternative standards. Based on this information, the Administrator concludes that the current primary PM 2.5 standards are not requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety, as required by the Clean Air Act, and that these revisions are warranted to provide the appropriate degree of increased public health protection.
As a former senior EPA air office official observed about the 1997 standard:
Nuance and uncertainty were also lacking in EPA's public communications after proposal. The agency's sound bite was that the science demanded the revisions.
Although it was true that EPA's assessment of the science found a need to tighten 64 Executive Order 12866, Section 1(a). 1993 the standards, the particular standards proposed were obviously not wholly determined by science.
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The statutory language forces EPA staff to present vague justifications that are careful not to express considerations of economic tradeoffs. Yet, because there is no threshold below which models do not predict health effects, short of eliminating these criteria pollutants altogether, science alone cannot identify what standard along the modeled linear no-threshold dose-response function would be "requisite to protect public health." And yet, all involved regularly participate in a science charade in which EPA sets standards at non-zero levels and justifies the decision based solely on arguments that are characterized as strictly scientific.
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee
The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee is a seven-member committee the Clean Air Act established "to provide advice and recommendations to EPA." 66 Members are chosen on the basis of their scientific expertise, generally serve for two consecutive three-year terms, and meet 12 to 15 times a year. Their expertise is often supplemented by panels of 20 or more experts on the health and environmental effects of the specific pollutants that are under review. As Figure 2 shows, these CASAC panels are involved at all stages of the NAAQS development process.
As recent reports from the Keystone Center and BPC have observed, scientific advisory panels can provide valuable input to agency decision making. However, they caution that "in general, scientific advisory panels should not be asked to recommend specific regulatory policies" 67 or "to answer questions that go beyond matters of scientific judgment." 68 As noted above, the Clean Air Act authorizes CASAC to recommend "new national ambient air quality standards and revisions of existing criteria and standards as may be appropriate." Similar to the problem discussed above with respect to EPA staff, this allows CASAC to make hidden policy judgments couched in scientific terms and attempt to influence the Administrator's final policy decision. Note that the Act does not go so far as to require CASAC's approval of the Administrator's policy choice, and a Congressional Research Service (CRS) review of the history of CASAC observed that, until recently, committees eschewed the role of approver:
CASAC panels have a nearly 30-year history of working quietly in the background, advising the agency's staff on NAAQS reviews, and issuing what were called "closure letters" on the agency documents that summarize the science and the policy options behind the NAAQS. Closure letters have been used by CASAC panels to indicate a consensus that the agency staff's work provides an adequate scientific basis for regulatory decisions. The science and policy documents, written by EPA staff, generally have gone through several iterations before the scientists were satisfied, but, with the issuance of a closure letter, CASAC has in past years removed itself from the process, leaving the formal proposal and final choice of standards to the Administrator.
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This CASAC behavior of detaching itself from the final policy process was consistent with Weinberg's recommendation in his landmark paper on "trans-science," in which he observed:
Though the scientist cannot provide definite answers to trans-scientific questions any more than can the lawyer, the politician or a member of the lay public, he does have one crucially important role: to make clear where science ends and trans-science begins. -unanimously recommended decreasing the primary standard to within the range of 0.060-0.070 ppm. It is the Committee's consensus scientific opinion that your decision to set the primary ozone standard above this range fails to satisfy the explicit stipulations of the Clean Air Act that you ensure an adequate margin of safety for all individuals, including sensitive populations. 72 (emphasis in
original)
The CRS report observes that CASAC's recent advocacy deviates from its past practice, when it refrained from objecting to policy decisions that differed from its recommendations. It points to two examples where EPA administrators took no action to revise standards, despite staff and CASAC recommendations that the standards be tightened: in 1990, with regard to the lead NAAQS, and in 1996, with regard to the sulfur dioxide NAAQS. CASAC did not object in either case. 73 In a more recent case, CASAC did not publicly object to Administrator Lisa Jackson's decision not to revise the primary standard for coarse particles (PM 10 ) in 2012, despite its conclusion that "it is clear that the current PM 10 standard is not adequate to protect the public health," 74 and recommendation "that the primary standard for PM 10 should be revised downwards."
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Distinction between science and policy blurred
The more activist stance of recent committees clearly crosses the line between science and policy. In response to an EPA workgroup effort to improve the NAAQS process, several former CASAC members expressed concerns about CASAC's ability to distinguish between science and policy recommendations. I found a sense among several CASAC members that the CASAC is responsible for approving the proposed standards rather than giving advice and recommendations. The Agency should make clear to CASAC what they require in terms of scientific advice and what they consider to be policy issues, on which they do not need advice. The line between science and policy is not always apparent, and this difference should be made clear in the charge questions given to CASAC. Neither scientists nor policy makers want to draw the line [between science and policy], or to define it or admit to it. CASAC meetings are rife with discussions about how its pronouncements will affect policy, and scientist advocates (on CASAC and its panels, as well as others) game the system to achieve their ideological policy goals. When EPA proposes or promulgates standards, it is reluctant to state clearly how science and policy enter into the decision-it wants to portray that all is based on science. These behaviors are absolutely understandable-most scientists are convinced that they know what's best for the country, and EPA Administrators don't want to admit to any motive other than the "best science." 79 The bald consideration of nonscientific factors by CASAC in making its recommendations is illustrated in the committee's deliberations on the 2007 lead NAAQS. Members objected to the standard the Administrator was considering because "it wouldn't create any pressure on any person producing lead in the environment today from reducing because it doesn't leave any more exceedances than the current standard."
80 They presented various non-science arguments in support of their preferred, more stringent, policy option, including the "need to regulate it at a level that causes public attention to come to the problem," and that "causes the most severe polluters to have to put in additional controls..."
81
The Committee discussions appear to suffer from the symptoms identified in the organizational behavior literature regarding group behavior, including close-mindedness, involving a collective effort "to rationalize" so as to discount warnings or information that might lead to reconsideration, and stereotyped views of enemies, as too evil to warrant efforts at negotiation or "too weak and stupid to counter" the group's…choices.
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Transcripts of CASAC's 2007 meetings on the lead NAAQS decisions, for example, reveal that its members had few real disagreements with each other or with EPA staff. This means the committee likely lacked the value of independent analysis and challenge that is so essential to the scientific method. The discussions appear to exhibit the "asymmetrical trust" symptomatic of insular group dynamics that perpetuates an "us vs. them" mindset. 83 While committee members treat each other and EPA staff, with whom they often have a close working relationship, with respect, their comments reflect a "stereotyped view of enemies," including policy officials, other agency staff, and the public. 84 For example, committee members objected strongly to providing the broader public an opportunity to comment on issues not preapproved by the committee, and members expressed the view that anyone not part of the committee likely had a conflict of interest. on issues because that put commenters "on an equal basis with the CASAC," and constituted "taking a group that has a clear conflict of interest and treating them as though they are equal to CASAC."
CASAC panels may lack diversity
Former CASAC chair George Wolff has raised concerns that EPA's selection of panel members exacerbates this problem. He noted several differences between the panel reviewing the 1997 fine particle NAAQS and the 2006 standard, including a change in the composition of the panels:
In the 1994-96 review, there were a number of Panel members who were skeptical that the epidemiology studies demonstrated cause and effect including one biostatistician and one epidemiologist who were not authors of the studies that found statistical links between PM and health endpoints. As a result, the Panel expressed "a diversity of opinion."
When the new Panel was formed, most of the Panel members who supported a causal role in 1996 were invited back to be on the new panel. Most of the skeptics were not. Instead they were replaced by individuals that, on the balance, were more supportive of the Agency's position. In fact, by the time the Panel concluded the review, seven out of 22 members had been authors of papers that purport causality. No epidemiologist or statistician who questioned causality was a member of the Panel. This lack of balance on the Panel predetermined the outcome of the review. 86 Former CASAC chair Roger McClellan expressed concern that CASAC panel "membership has been excessively dominated by scientists that to a large extent have developed the scientific information contained in the documents [they are charged with reviewing]," noting that "in some cases, the individuals have already offered opinions as to how the science should be used to set…a more stringent standard based on their science." 87 According to a Congressional investigation, 16 of the 20 members of the CASAC panel charged with reviewing the science in support of the 2015 ozone NAAQS had conducted studies they were supposed to evaluate, and 14 of the 20 members had been principal or co-investigators for EPA grants totaling more than $120 million.
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CASAC's treatment of uncertainty
The unabashed crossing of the line between science and policy is also evident in the treatment of uncertainty and risk communication. uncertainty inherent in supporting analyses, the drive for a narrow range of policy options may limit their willingness to quantify the full uncertainty range or to explore the quantitative implications of alternative science policy choices. For example, the 2007 lead NAAQS transcript reveals that CASAC members were initially critical of an EPA method for measuring health effects on the grounds that it was oversimplified and didn't rely on current data and modeling techniques. When EPA staff pointed out that this simplified method would more likely lead policy makers to a level already preferred by CASAC, compared to the more sophisticated method, CASAC members dropped their objections.
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CASAC's position on how to manage uncertainty is another example of a hidden policy decision. The strongly-worded letter objecting to the Administrator's policy decision on the 2006 PM 2.5 NAAQS, states that, "while there is uncertainty associated with the risk assessment for the PM 2.5 standard, this very uncertainty suggests a need for a prudent approach to providing an adequate margin of safety." 90 Yet, this assertion that uncertainty demands a "prudent" policy decision stands in contrast to the statement of former chairman, Bernard Goldstein, who told EPA:
How one deals with the uncertainties is a policy issue. One can say that a lot of uncertainty suggests being more conservative to be sure we are "safe." Another policy might be that a large amount of uncertainties means that we cannot select appropriate levels until we have more information. In any case, the amount of uncertainty should be fully addressed and central estimates should be given as well as the upper and lower confidence limits. Again, the policy decisions made should be explicit and clearly stated in public. 91 As this discussion has shown, CASAC members' views of their role has evolved over time to be increasingly involved in the policy decision as to the level at which the standard should be set, yet still present such a recommendation as "science." This may be due, in part, to the individuals EPA staff select to serve on the committee and panels, 92 and the charge EPA gives them. 93 As discussed further below, members' views constrain policy officials and the courts, and influence public opinion. When differences of opinion about policies are cast as scientific disagreements, accusations of politicized science arise. However, as the BPC noted, "some disputes over the 'politicization' of science actually arise over differences about policy choices that science can 89 inform, but not determine." 94 The role of CASAC in setting NAAQS illustrates processes that both perpetuate hidden policy judgments and science charades, inviting use of the is-ought fallacy.
Policy Officials
Under the Clean Air Act, it is the EPA Administrator (and thus the president at whose pleasure she serves) who is ultimately responsible for issuing primary NAAQS, "the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 95 Similarly the Act requires the Administrator to set secondary NAAQS at a level which, in her judgment, "is requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." 96 Though EPA staff prepares a regulatory impact analysis, including an assessment of the likely costs and benefits of achieving different standards, the Administrator does not consider it, and staff does not present it to her.
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As discussed above, in choosing the level of the standard, the Administrator faces pressure from EPA staff and CASAC members. In addition, outside groups, including state and local governments (which are responsible for implementing and achieving the standard), potentially regulated parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Congress attempt to influence the Administrator's decision. Also, other Administration officials (who often are responsible for implementing competing policy goals and may also be hearing from constituencies outside the government) may seek to sway the Administrator's determination.
The Administrator deviates from the recommendations of the Policy Assessment and CASAC at her peril. 98 If she makes a decision outside of the staff and CASAC recommendations presented to her, the Administrator runs the risk that NGOs will file suit to overturn her decision (possibly with support from EPA staff, who may even work with the Justice Department to make sure that the Administrator loses the lawsuit It is important to point out that hidden policy judgments by scientists not only discourage policy makers from setting standards higher than those recommended by staff, but lower as well. At one point in the development of the 2008 lead NAAQS, consideration was given to seeking public comment on whether zero was appropriate as the lower end of the range at which to set the standard. Given the lack of a threshold in health effects, and CASAC's unanimous and vocal opinion that lead remained a very serious public health risk, some policy officials questioned the justification for setting any standard above zero. 103 Available data and modeling made it difficult for the Administrator to conclude that a lead ambient air quality standard of 0.15 ug/m 3 was "requisite" to protect public health with an "adequate margin of safety," but 0.5 ug/m 3 or 0 ug/m Sometimes the influence of the staff and CASAC is so strong that the decision requires an explicit and public policy judgment to be made above the Administrator and carefully explained to the public. In 2008, during the interagency review of EPA's ozone NAAQS, disagreement over the form of the secondary "welfare" standard was so contentious that President Bush ultimately had to step in to resolve it. 105 Deliberations within the executive are generally not States supporting more stringent standards are joined by NGOs, such as the American Lung Association and the Natural Resources Defense Council, in seeking a remand of EPA standards on the grounds that they are not adequately protective according to statutory criteria. 119 States supporting less stringent standards sue EPA seeking to have NAAQS vacated because the Agency did not establish that the standards are requisite to protect health and welfare under the meaning of the Act. These states are supported by industry litigants (such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, and the National Association of Home Builders). 120 Given the statutory construction, none of the litigants openly express policy arguments for preferring one standard over another, but rather they couch their legal arguments in terms of science-highlighting differences between CASAC's recommended levels and the Administrator's choice, and debating what science is needed to determine what levels are "requisite" to protect public health and welfare, and what qualifies as an "adequate margin of safety."
Lower courts also help enforce the Act's requirement for reviews of the standards every five years. In response to litigation over missed statutory deadlines, the government will enter into consent decrees that impose judicial deadlines for issuing standards. 122 Particularly given the steps involved in preparing the regulatory record in NAAQS proceedings, these deadlines constrain the opportunity for meaningful public consultation and interagency review. 123 EPA often submits draft regulations to OIRA for interagency review just days before such deadlines.
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Even as the courts drive the NAAQS process forward and enforce the Clean Air Act's procedural requirements, they avoid questioning anything in the administrative record that is characterized as science. This understandable deference to agency fact-finding has a curious result: it tends to limit the EPA Administrator's ability to exercise the policy discretion that the Congress has entrusted to her. If she makes a policy decision that conflicts with the policy preferences of EPA staff or science advisors, there will be a conflict in the administrative record, falsely framed as a policy choice inconsistent with the "science." Judges find it easy to vacate administrative decisions in such circumstances. Whatever doubts she may have about the merits of the options placed before her, the safest thing for the Administrator to do is simply acquiesce in the recommendations of her staff. The deference that courts properly owe to the political branches is captured, instead, by an unelected bureaucracy and outside science advisors due to the science charade.
Summary
The NAAQS process exemplifies the incentives at work that compel every party to the regulation to engage in hidden policy judgment and the science charade. Congress directs EPA to set the standards to achieve noble goals, but encourages the politicization of science by restricting the agency from openly considering relevant nonscientific factors. Combined with tight deadlines, the statutory language permits Congress to take credit for laudable public goals, while blaming the executive branch's execution for any undesirable outcomes. The courts have reinforced a limited interpretation of the Act, as well as tight deadlines for issuing revised standards. Executive branch career and policy officials respond by hiding policy judgments and creating a science charade, developing scientific-sounding explanations to justify one standard over officials, the media, and the public with 'spin' on the science… with results distilled to the 'sound bite.'" Bachmann 2007: 687. 122 For example, EPA faces a judicial deadline to issue final ozone NAAQS by October 15, 2015.
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/ozone/data/201404ozonenaaqsorder.pdf 123 Fraas, Arthur. "Observations on OIRA's Policies and Procedures." Administrative Law Review Vol. 63, Special Edition: OIRA Thirtieth Anniversary Conference (2011), p. 86. 124 Since the mid-1990s, the average interagency review time for NAAQS rules subject to deadlines was less than 20 days, compared to an average review time of more than 70 days for all EPA rules over the same period. Statistics can be derived from data available at www.RegInfo.gov.
another, and public interveners vigorously defend alternative standards based on their own interpretation of the "science."
Scientists argue for the primacy of their data, analysts have an incentive to downplay rather than reveal uncertainties regarding their predictions or the implications of key risk assessment policy choices, and decision makers point to science as either requiring a new standard or as determining that existing standards are adequate.
This has evolved into an adversarial process, characterized by harsh rhetoric in which each party claims the science supports its preferred policy outcome and questions opponents' credibility and motives, rather than a constructive discussion regarding appropriate data, assumptions and normative decisions. The real reasons for selecting a particular standard may not even be discussed. This harms the credibility of science advice and results in poorer decision making.
Recommendations
Despite the National Research Council's guidance over 30 years ago, controversy remains surrounding regulatory actions aimed at reducing risk, leading to accusations of "politicized science," "advocacy science," or "junk science." What the NRC in 1983 identified as "a blurring of the distinction between risk assessment policy and risk management policy" 125 is enabled by the is-ought fallacy and leads to hidden policy judgments and science charades that harm policy outcomes and can damage faith in science itself.
In thinking about reforms to improve how science is used in developing regulations, clarifying which aspects of the decision are matters of science and which are matters of policy is essential to avoid both hidden policy judgments and the science charade. When people condemn the "politicization" of science, 126 the problem may really be that we ask too much of science in addressing policy problems. The Clean Air Act succumbs to the is-ought fallacy and does not permit transparent consideration of relevant policy factors when developing regulations. Other statutes, particularly those dealing with health, safety and the environment, are vulnerable to the same problem. As the BPC recommended, a focus of reform should be on devising regulatory processes that, "in as many situations as possible, …help clarify for both officials and the general public which aspects of disputes are truly about scientific results and which concern policy."
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This would not only help address the is-ought fallacy, but also the problem of hidden policy judgments, in which the effect of risk assessment policy judgments on estimates of outcomes are Numerous experts have offered specific recommendations for improving the conduct of regulatory science. The recommendations that follow attempt to alter the incentives of the parties to the rulemaking process; the first category would address behavior contributing to the is-ought fallacy, the second would specifically address the problem of hidden policy judgments, and the third would improve incentives generally.
Is-Ought Fallacy
The is-ought fallacy is the pretense that normative policy decisions regarding what "ought to be" can be determined exclusively by positive scientific information that describes what "is." This mistake can lead to both hidden policy judgments in risk assessments and a science charade in justifying policy decisions. The first two recommendations aim to reduce incentives to succumb to the is-ought fallacy.
1. Legislators must be more forthright in recognizing that "science" is a positive discipline that can inform, but not decide, appropriate policy.
It would be challenging to convince legislators to avoid the is-ought fallacy and resist delegating decisions to agencies on the pretense that science alone can make the normative determination of what policy ought to be. This includes asking science advisors to recommend policy judgments they are typically ill-suited to provide. For legislators to make the effort to elevate the debate above simple rhetoric, they must have different incentives and expectations of rewards than exist now. Currently, there is no feedback loop to reward a politician for tackling these issues openly and seriously.
Comparing the effectiveness of different statutes can be illuminating, however. Some statutes directed at health, safety and environmental risks have facilitated more rational regulatory policy than others by recognizing that risk management requires normative judgments that consider tradeoffs. For example, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires EPA to consider the costs as well as the benefits of requiring local water authorities to install controls for specific substances. Perhaps that is one reason why the debates over drinking water standards are generally less acrimonious than debates over ambient air quality standards. Since the statute allows explicit consideration of tradeoffs when setting standards, the full burden of decision-making is not vested in the risk assessment. As a result, policy makers and interested parties may have less incentive to embed policy preferences in the risk assessment portion of the analysis, because they can debate them openly and transparently in the risk management discussion. Codifying current executive requirements for performing regulatory impact analyses, including benefit-cost analyses, could provide a "supermandate" that would require agencies to explicitly present uncertainties and tradeoffs and to justify decisions in a transparent manner.
130
2. Legislators and policymakers must clarify the appropriate role for scientific advisors.
The engagement of scientific advisory panels can provide a necessary and valuable source of information and peer review for agency science, but greater efforts should be made to restrict their advice to matters of science, and not ask them to recommend regulatory policies. When asked to advise on policy choices, as is the case with CASAC, it is impossible for members not to be tempted to wrap their policy views in a lab coat and present them as scientific recommendations.
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As a former EPA scientist observed:
Scientific information must remain a cornerstone of public policy decisions, but I offer cautionary guidance to scientists: get involved in policy deliberations, but play the appropriate role. Provide facts, probabilities, and analysis, but avoid normative science. Scientists have much to offer the public and decision-makers, but also have much to lose when they practice stealth policy advocacy.
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Cox observes:
Experts, like other people, typically have high confidence in their own judgments, even when these lack objective validity. 133 But subjective confidence in subjective judgments should not be used in place of sound, objective scientific methods. To do so, as in EPA's risk assessment for ozone, replaces sound science with potentially arbitrary, biased, and mistaken judgments.
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Legislators should be clear, when establishing committees like CASAC, to limit the role of scientific advisory panels to advising on science. Executive branch policy officials should also be 130 very clear in drafting charge questions for advisory committees to solicit their scientific expertise without encouraging them to blur the lines between scientific expertise and policy judgment. 135 As both the BPC and Keystone reports emphasized, the questions posed to such panels "should be clearly articulated, and 'explicitly differentiate, to the extent possible, between questions that involve scientific judgments and questions that involve judgments about economics, ethics, and other matters of policy. '" 136 Experts with formal training and experience in policy analysis, economics, law, and other disciplines are much better equipped to provide advice on these latter questions.
Hidden Policy Judgments
Risk assessment necessarily involves assumptions and judgments as well as pure scientific inputs, yet they often generate precise-sounding predictions that hide not only considerable uncertainty about the actual risk, but hidden policy judgements. When scientists, intentionally or unintentionally, insert, but do not disclose, their own policy preferences in the scientific advice they provide government decision-makers, it harms the credibility of science advice and results in poorer policy decisions.
3. The executive branch must establish procedures and incentives to make more transparent the effect different credible risk assessment inputs and assumptions have on the range of plausible outcomes. Once a range of plausible risk outcomes is identified based on different scientifically plausible inputs, agencies could transparently identify which set of inputs, models, and outcomes comported with its preferred risk assessment policy choice. Policy officials would choose specific numerical values from a range of scientifically plausible risk estimates and publicly defend the risk assessment policy choices that support that choice. This would provide a serious incentive for policy officials to look into estimates of risk, consult with a broad variety of experts to understand the range of scientific views and explicitly articulate the policy preferences informing their decisions.
Greater transparency regarding the assumptions and policy rationales for choosing one set of assumptions or models over another would encourage more openness and constructive discussion about science and policy, improving the ultimate policy decision and probably engendering greater acceptance of that policy choice. 4. The executive branch should institutionalize reforms that encourage greater feedback and challenge of risk assessment practices and policy choices.
Greater transparency in the models, assumptions, and risk assessment policy choices could encourage more open, constructive debate on those choices. 141 The scientific method depends on falsifiable hypotheses, data gathering, replication, dissent, and challenge, to ensure objective analysis to minimize bias in the interpretation of results.
No one is truly objective. We all approach problems with our own prior views and perceptions, and, particularly when faced with new or incomplete information, we tend to look to others in whom we trust to help form our opinions and make decisions. Research suggests that individuals form more extreme views when surrounded by others with similar perspectives. 142 Institutional reforms that intentionally engage, rather than avoid, competing views, could go a long way to improve the clarity of the risk assessment process and the decisions that depend on scientific input.
President Obama built on his predecessors' efforts to provide for interagency review of different aspects of regulatory decisions, including the underlying science. He directed agencies to
encourage an "open exchange of information and perspectives among State, local, and tribal officials, experts in relevant disciplines, affected stakeholders in the private sector, and the public as a whole, …including relevant scientific and technical findings."
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Successful reforms might involve pre-rulemaking disclosure of risk assessment information, to engage broad public comment on the proper choice of studies, models, assumptions, etc. long before any policy decisions are framed, and "positions" established. Advanced notices of proposed rulemaking could be used effectively to gather such input. 144 5. Scientific advisory panels should be required to represent a diversity of perspectives, disciplines, expertise, and experience.
The 2012 Keystone Center report offers a series of recommendations on "the composition of committees that are empaneled to review the science behind a regulatory decision." 145 Acknowledging the importance of choosing panelists that "have the knowledge, training, and experience needed to address the charge to the panel," 146 it admonished agencies "to recognize that all potential panelists will have conscious and unconscious biases," and said that "the panel selection process requires review of the disclosed information and a judgment as to the ability of each prospective panelist to participate in open discussion and to consider other perspectives." 147 The report goes on to recommend:
Because biases exist, an agency should strive to engage a wide range of perspectives of qualified scientific experts. We endorse the BPC report's statement that, "Agencies should not shy away from including scientists on a panel who are considered 'outliers' on the question(s) under consideration, provided that the scientist is a respected practitioner in a relevant field and the committee as a whole fairly represents the mainstream." 
Improving incentives for feedback, learning and experimentation
The scientific method involves forming a hypotheses, making predictions based on that hypothesis, and data gathering and empirical testing, followed by revisions to the hypothesis and predictions based on results. It represents a systems approach whereby feedback and challenge inform action and encourage learning. The recommendations that follow would improve incentives for feedback, learning and experimentation.
6. The legislative and executive branches should institutionalize feedback through retrospective review of regulatory outcomes.
Regulatory programs are rarely subjected to rigorous evaluation and feedback. Most regulatory analyses rely on models and assumptions to make predictions about the risk reduction benefits that will accrue from a specific intervention. Institutionalizing a requirement to evaluate whether the predicted effects of the regulation were realized would provide an incentive to improve the use of science for predicting the benefits of interventions. Agencies should be required to include in proposed regulations a framework for empirical testing of assumptions and hypothesized outcomes. To incentivize more robust evaluation along the lines identified above, agencies could be required to test the validity of risk-reduction predictions before commencing new regulation that relies on models. The five-year NAAQS reviews, for example, could be required to apply quasi-experimental (QE) techniques to gather and analyze epidemiology data and health outcome trends in different regions of the country and compare them against predictions.
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Congress and OMB should reallocate resources from ex ante analysis to allow agencies to gather the information and evaluation tools necessary to validate ex ante predications. Shifting resources from ex ante analysis to ex post review would not only help with evaluation, but would improve our ex ante hypotheses of regulatory effects. Whether President Trump's requirement on differences in treatments (such as differences in attainment status with NAAQS) can inform risk assessments going forward. QE evaluation techniques provide an opportunity to improve understanding of the relation between human health and particulates air pollution. In a QE evaluation, the researcher compares outcomes between a treatment group and a control group, just as in a classical experiment; but treatment status is determined by politics, an accident, a regulatory action, or some other action beyond the researcher's control. The key difference with an observational study in this setting is that the QE approach is devoted to identifying treatment-induced variation in particulates that plausibly mitigates confounding or omitted variables bias in the estimated relation between human health and particulates, rather than relying on the variation presented by nature and optimizing agents. Despite the "nonrandom" assignment of treatment status, it is possible to draw causal inferences from the differences in outcomes (by "outcomes," we refer to both air pollution levels and human health) between the treatment and control groups in a quasi-or natural experiment, provided certain assumptions are met.
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Agencies could conduct pilot studies or "deploy different regulations where empirical evaluations of such differences will help resolve disputed issues of regulatory policy." 159 8. Greater weight should be placed on scientific studies that were subject to peer review and whose results are reproducible.
Peer review is often considered a fundamental component of the scientific process. Concerns over the extent and rigor of review of important scientific analyses led OMB in 2004 to issue a memorandum establishing guidelines for the use of external peer-review at all federal agencies and departments. 160 OMB has also directed agencies to issue information quality guidelines to, among other things, ensure the objectivity of information, including "a high degree of transparency about data and methods to facilitate the reproducibility of such information by qualified third parties." 161 These guidelines did not require reproducibility, however, observing that "reproducibility of data is an indication of transparency about research design and methods and thus a replication exercise (i.e., a new experiment, test, or sample) shall not be required prior to each dissemination."
Scientific publishing is focusing more on the sharing of data and experimental transparency.
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The journal Science, for example, has undertaken "initiatives to increase transparency and promote reproducibility in the published research literature... Connected to that progress, and an essential element to its success, an additional focus will be on making data more open, easier to access, more discoverable, and more thoroughly documented."
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As the Science editors observe, "When the greatest number of creative and insightful minds can find, access, and understand the essential features that led to the collection of a data set, the data reach their highest potential." 164 A greater emphasis on reproducibility can encourage challenge and validation so important to the scientific method.
9. Legislation should recognize that states have a core interest in environmental quality, and that experimentation and competition among states can be a powerful force for improving environmental outcomes and our practical knowledge of what works.
Many environmental statutes are structured, appropriately, with a prominent federalist framework. Much of the on-the-ground work is left to states, which makes sense because pollution is primarily a problem of local externalities, and also because local knowledge and local experimentation can be brought to bear on problems that are not susceptible to one-sizefits-all federal rules. As implemented, however, the NAAQS process assigns to EPA staff an artificial scientific determination, isolated from any practical considerations, and assigns to the states all of the problems of implementation, while depriving them of the policy discretion that might allow them to solve those problems. The resulting dynamic channels competitive energy into unproductive directions.
Perhaps a better division of responsibility would be for the federal government to conduct basic risk assessment research and share information on environmental damages, but defer to states or regional associations on decisions regarding the risk management policies appropriate for their situations. This would offer several advantages. First, it would help distinguish risk assessment from risk management, especially if combined with other recommendations aimed at avoiding the is-ought fallacy. Second, it would encourage risk management decisions to be made where they can best reflect the circumstances and preferences of affected citizens. 165 Third, the nation as a whole would gain from experimentation regarding how different policy measures work in practice, without imposing untried systems on the entire nation. 166 Such an approach would provide the natural experimental framework and data needed for more QE evaluation. 162 Joel Achenbach, "The new scientific revolution: Reproducibility at last." Washington Post. January 27, 2015. 163 Science 2 January 2015: Vol. 347 no. 6217 p. 7 164 Science, January 2015. 165 For pollutants that cross state borders, regional governance structures may be appropriate. 166 Where there are large national economies of scope, such as the development of vehicle emission standards, the risk management could be done at the national level. Absent such economies, greater discretion on risk 10. Agencies should engage in collaborative tools to generate knowledge.
Nobel laureate Fredrich von Hayek identified the central problem facing public policy as "the unavoidable imperfection of man's knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired." 167 Hayek's focus was on economic planning and he showed that decentralized markets focus dispersed information-information that no one individual can obtain-and convey it efficiently to market participants. Many of the risks of concern to regulatory agencies may not be accounted for in market transactions, however. In these cases, we may require a different solution to address Hayek's observation that relevant facts are never possessed by a single mind, to take advantage of knowledge "that is dispersed among many people."
New media may provide a vehicle for stimulating a broader exchange of ideas and expanding our knowledge by reducing transaction costs, significantly lowering the costs of gathering and aggregating information, and removing obstacles to collaboration across a wide spectrum of individuals. 168 E-rulemaking provides a platform for following and commenting on federal regulations, but to date, it has mainly served to facilitate traditional notice and comment, and not generated interactive, iterative engagement.
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To harness the wisdom of dispersed knowledge, agencies or outside parties might experiment with a collaborative "wiki" approach to public comment, where, rather than each individual or group filing comments in parallel and the agency responding to those comments individually, it could provide a forum for diverse individuals to build on each other's information, adding, editing, updating, and correcting to engage the wisdom of dispersed knowledge on issues where no one person has complete information. 171 In a system where anyone is free to get something started, however badly, a short, uninformative article can be the anchor for the good article that will eventually appear. Its very inadequacy motivates people to improve it; many more people are willing to make a bad article better than are willing to start a good article from scratch.
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Engaging public input through a wiki is an intriguing possibility that holds the potential to revolutionize how agencies gather information on which to base public policies.
Conclusions
Institutional arrangements in the regulatory development process tend to aggravate two contributors to the politicization of science: "hidden policy judgments" (not acknowledging the policy judgments inherent in risk assessment) and "science charades" (camouflaging policy decisions as science). Both of these problems threaten the credibility of the scientific process and harm regulatory policy. Many of those involved in regulatory decisions have incentives to hide policy preferences, such as how to deal with the uncertainty in assessments of risk, and to dismiss and denigrate dissenting views. In many cases, politicization is the result of officials falling prey to the "is-ought fallacy" (incorrectly mixing up positive information about what "is" with normative advice about what "ought to be"). Key policy choices, disguised as science, too often rest with technical staff; meanwhile, policy makers charged with making hard policy decisions are able to avoid responsibility by claiming that their hands were tied by "the science."
As a case study, this paper has examined the process by which EPA sets NAAQS under the Clean Air Act to illustrate some of the perverse incentives involved in developing regulations, and offered ten mechanisms to improve those incentives and resulting policy.
Effective environmental policy that focuses resources on addressing real threats to public health and the environment depends on reliable scientific information and transparent policy choices. The mechanisms offered here could reduce acrimony and improve the debate over environmental policy by helping distinguish between risk assessment and risk management, avoid the is-ought fallacy, and make more transparent previously hidden policy judgments. This will improve not only environmental outcomes, but the integrity of science advice.
